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Abstract
This paper provides a modelling framework for evaluating the exchange rate dynamics of a
target zone regime with undisclosed bands. We generalize the literature to allow for asymmet-
ric one-sided regimes. Market participants' beliefs concerning an undisclosed band change as
they learn more about central bank intervention policy. We apply the model to Hong Kong's
one-sided currency board mechanism. In autumn 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated
from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that the currency board would
be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities ﬁnally revamped
the regime as a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band.
Keywords: Currency Board Arrangement, Target Zone Model, Hong Kong
JEL-Classiﬁcation: C61, E42, F31, F32
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in exchange rate regimes for emerging economies.
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997-98, crisis prevention was viewed as a key criterion
for choosing an exchange rate regime. Much attention focused on the "hardness degrees" of
peg systems, and the standard textbook dichotomy of ﬂoat versus peg was replaced by a more
continuous grading of exchange rate regimes: free ﬂoats, various intermediate regimes, and hard
pegs.1 After the partial collapse of Europes exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in September
1992, a standard proposition attracting widespread support was that corner solutions such as
free ﬂoats or super-strict pegs (currency board, dollarisation) are preferable to intermediate
regimes (soft peg, band, crawling peg) on the grounds that they are less crisis-prone given that
todays ﬁnancial markets are too powerful and volatile. According to this view, investors will
overwhelm intermediate regimes like band systems sooner or later. Thus the options for exchange
rate regimes have been hollowed out. Governments should either let exchange rates ﬂoat or ﬁx
them permanently via a currency board or monetary union.2
In fairness, one should say that academics do not agree on the best solution. Until the mid-
1990s the mainstream literature argued essentially the opposite. Several objectives and trade-
oﬀs (insulation from external nominal and real shocks, ﬂexibility vs. commitment, inﬂation
stabilisation, exposure to international capital ﬂows) pointed to intermediate regimes with limited
ﬂexibility, i.e. a compromise between hard peg and free ﬂoat. Balancing risks and beneﬁts has
led to the conclusion that intermediate regimes were appropriate for many countries, especially
those without large exposure to international capital ﬂows. Another fundamental reason why
economists then considered the extremes - pure ﬂoat or absolute ﬁx - to be overdone is that
economics generally prefers interior to corner solutions.
A prime example for a hard peg is Hong Kongs currency board system.3 Hong Kongs currency
board stands out among such arrangements around the world as one of the oldest existing ones.4
Hong Kongs currency board was established in 1983 with the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) peg to
the US dollar (USD) at 7.80 to 1 as a ﬁrm anchor for the external value of the HKD. The USD
was an obvious choice, as the US was a major trading partner of Hong Kong. In September
1998, the convertibility rate was changed to 7.75 to 1. Subsequently the rate moved gradually
over the period between April 1999 and August 2000 back to the linked rate of 7.80, where it
has since remained. A distinctive feature of the system was that up to May 2005 no strong-side
boundary existed. Thus, the currency board system was asymmetric. Finally, in May 2005
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) decided to bite the bullet on appreciation and
replaced the previous implicit strong band with something less muddled. More precisely, the
HKMA introduced a symmetric target zone with a band of [7.75, 7.85].
1More attention was also given to the distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes, as
revealed by the ex-post behaviour of exchange rates.
2But free ﬂoats have a big drawback: they can overshoot and become highly unstable, especially in open
emerging economies with large capital ﬂows.
3An in-depth discussion of Hong Kongs currency board including technical details, is available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/currency/link_ex/index.htm. For a perceptive and thorough discussion, see
Latter (2007).
4In the empirical exchange rate literature, the performance of currency board systems has been discussed ad
nauseam. For example, Ghosh et al. (2000) have found that currency boards exhibit better inﬂation performance
than soft pegs, mostly due to a credibility eﬀect. Regarding growth, currency boards also do better than soft
pegs.
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In this paper we provide new theoretical insights in the working of Hong Kongs currency board
system since January 2001. While there is a huge literature on symmetric target zones, extensive
research on one-sided regimes with implicit bands is lacking. Based upon Klein (1992), we
expand the scope of the existing literature and oﬀer a new analytical framework for one-sided
target zones with implicit (unknown) bands and derive the exchange rate dynamics of such
regimes. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief self-contained overview
of Hong Kongs currency board system. Section 3 then presents an analytical framework for
modelling Hong Kongs currency board system since January 2001. The theoretical modelling
approach provides the input for the calibration exercise in Section 4. The ﬁnal section oﬀers
concluding remarks.
2 Main Features of Hong Kongs Currency Board System
Since 2001
We begin by discussing the main elements of Hong Kongs currency board system, to provide
an anchor for our modelling work. Contrary to actively managed ﬁxed exchange rate systems, a
currency board system is a passive "hard-ﬁxed" peg system. The predictability and rule-based
nature of a currency board are its key advantages. Like a traditional peg, a currency board oﬀers
the prospect of stable exchange rates, which can promote both investment and trade.
Hong Kongs currency board has survived a number of booms and busts, including a massive
speculative attack during Asias ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98. Given the speculative outﬂow of US
dollars, HKMA sold large amounts of US dollars in October 1998, to defend the peg. Furthermore,
HKMA pursued a defensive interest rate strategy, which was partly responsible for bringing on a
severe recession.5 Despite the presumed rigidity of the currency board system, the convergence
between the exchange rate in the interbank market and the ﬁxed rate for the currency was
not realised. Thus the ﬁrst major set of reforms of the operational framework after the Asian
crisis involved the introduction of a weak-side Convertibility Undertaking (CU). This was an
asymmetric weak-side commitment in that HKMA was ready to sell US dollars at 7.80, but was
not obliged to purchase them at a pre-announced rate.6 This weak-side commitment is shown
by the red line in Figure 1. Since late 2003, speculative pressure for a revaluation of the Chinese
Renminbi has grown, resulting in large speculative inﬂows.7 The HKD appreciated from 7.80
to about 7.70 in autumn 2003, fuelling speculation that the currency board link to the USD
5The result of this surprise move was that interbank interest rates jumped and the overnight rate hit 280
percent. This successfully stemmed the speculative outﬂow of US dollars. Overnight rates dropped back to about
5 percent within a few days.
6As a historical note, while no formal strong-side intervention point was introduced, the Subcommittee on
Currency Board Operations already considered the options in this area in meetings in October 1999 and July
2000 and "agreed that there would be scope to review the arrangement again, should the need arise" [HKMA
(2000)].
7One reason for the strengthening of the HKD was the signing of the Mainland China and Hong Kong Closer
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in June 2003 which was expected to provide stimulus to Hong Kongs
economy. This has led some market participants to believe that any appreciation of the renminbi against the US
dollar could lead to an appreciation of the HKD. Another reason why Hong Kongs "iron peg" has come under
attack despite strong economic fundamentals might be that HKMA has begun to look a bit too much like a de
facto central bank, intervening in money markets to smooth interest rates. This kind of intervention undermines
the advantages of the currency board since the system is no longer regarded as automatic.
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Figure 1: Daily HKD spot exchange rate against USD and exchange rate band
Source: Bloomberg
might be abandoned.8 During these years, the exact exchange rate triggering HKMA strong-side
intervention was unknown to the public. Only the latest interventions would provide hints as to
HKMAs intentions. Lastly, the link was defended with a combination of market interventions,
including direct foreign exchange operations and manipulation of liquidity and interest rates.
An assessment stemming from the 2003-2004 episode is that HKMA has had a tried-and-trusted
method for halting intermittent appreciation pressure: beyond some undisclosed threshold they
have intervened. In other words, there was a ﬂexible strong-side regime that was managed as if
it were ﬁxed but without an explicit strong-side precommitment.
Over and above these actions, on 18 May 2005 HKMA ﬁnally revamped the one-sided currency
board mechanism as a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band of ±0.6
percent. The strong-side Convertibility Undertaking (green line in Figure 1) was ﬁxed at HKD
7.75/USD.9 At the same time, the weak-side CU was changed from HKD 7.80/USD to HKD
7.85/USD. These "reﬁnements" were intended to anchor market expectations and to prevent
speculative attacks. Figure 1 shows that the HKD spot rate stayed close to the strong-side CU
(green line) most of the time after May 2005. Finally, note that the validity of the current
arrangement has not been called into question by the current ﬁnancial crisis.
3 Modelling Discretion on the Strong Side
Until May 2005 Hong Kongs exchange rate system comprised a credible weak-side CU and
an undisclosed strong-side CU. Ultimately, the system was thus an undisclosed one-sided target
8For an analysis of the strong-side pressure on the HKD and particularly HKMAs response, see IMF (2005).
This paper also oﬀers a simple second-generation currency crisis framework for modelling trade-oﬀs faced by
HKMA.
9In other words, the HKMA moved from a single-edge shield towards a double-edged shield and thus the idea
of target zones made a comeback. One underlying motivation was that, if appreciation pressures were to recur
often, this could undermine the credibility of the currency board arrangement. For a theoretical analysis of this
lightning-bolt solution, see Chen et al. (2010).
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zone model.10 Keeping in mind the speciﬁc one-sidedness of the currency board system, we study
the associated credibility issues and the exchange rate dynamics in a formal model. Roughly
speaking, we attempt to model the working inside the clock. The new aspects and insights of
this paper are to extend the previous work by Klein (1992). Klein (1992) analysed the dynamics
of the exchange rate in a target zone with unknown band width. In our model, past exchange
rate interventions convey information about the undisclosed bands and aﬀect the exchange rate
dynamics via the changed fundamentals and triggered revision of exchange rate expectations.
3.1 Basic Model
It is useful to preface a detailed discussion of the one-sided target zone model with some reference
to Krugmans (1991) seminal paper. Although the review pretends to be brief, it will be adequate
to demonstrate the conceptual and research framework. His model starts from the observation
that due to the forward-looking nature of rational expectations, the presence of a credible and
perfectly known band exerts an inﬂuence on the dynamics of the exchange rate. The model
starts with the log-linear asset pricing equation that expresses the log exchange rate, s(t), as the
sum of the logarithm of the fundamental, f , and its own expected change:
s(t) = f(t) + τ
E(ds(t))
dt
,(1)
where E[·] denotes the rational expectations operator and τ > 0. The factors aﬀecting the
exchange rate are the fundamentals and ﬁnancial markets' expectations of the future movement
of the exchange rate. The fundamental f consists of the logarithm of money supply, m, and
velocity, v:
f(t) = m(t) + v(t).(2)
Except for intervention periods, m(t) is constant. In the case of an intervention at t = T , the
money supply takes a new value in T . Beyond intervention periods, the driving force of f is
v. Therefore, the values of the function f will be denoted by V for possible strong/weak band
thresholds. It is assumed that the log of the velocity follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
without drift:
dv(t) = σdz,(3)
where σ is the risk parameter and z a standard Brownian motion. To handle this process, we
introduce a function g with
g(f) = s(t).(4)
Applying Itô's lemma to the expectations term yields
E(ds)
dt
=
σ2
2
g′′,(5)
which means that the logarithm of the exchange rate is subject to the second-order diﬀerential
equation
s(t) = f(t) + τ
σ2
2
g′′.(6)
10An implicit strong-side band is likely because history has shown that Hong Kongs policymakers place a
heavy emphasis on exchange rate stability.
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The innovation in the paper is that we solve the second-order ordinary diﬀerential equation (6)
describing the dynamics of the exchange rate in the target zone for the special case of a one-sided
target zone with an undisclosed strong-side band. This provides a sound modelling framework
with considerable rigour enabling an understanding of HKD dynamics since January 2001.11
3.2 One-Sided Target Zone Framework
In Krugmans (1991) model the central bank credibly commits to maintaining the symmetric
target zone regime. Given Hong Kongs asymmetric exchange rate regime, the question becomes:
How do we introduce such asymmetric dynamics into the target zone model? In our one-sided
target zone model, the weak-side band S is credibly ﬁxed. On the contrary, the central banks
strong-side band S is undisclosed. In other words, we assume a "high" conﬁdence weak-side bank
and a "low" conﬁdence strong-side band. Market participants form expectations of the undis-
closed strong-side band S. Their expectations depend on the unknown threshold that triggers a
central bank intervention.
Assume that the exchange rate that triggers intervention against appreciation pressure is ex-
pected to be somewhere in the interval [S1, S2], S1, S2 ∈ R with S1 < S2, and the corresponding
fundamental values form the interval [V1, V2] with V1 < V2.
In order to obtain a solution for equation (6) in the case of a one-side target zone, we imple-
ment the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions and substitute the fundamental value
V l, V l ∈ [V1, V2], which triggers the next intervention on the strong side:12
s(t) = f(t) +A1(V
l)erf(t) +A2(V
l)e−rf(t),(7)
where
r =
√
2
τσ2
A1(V
l) = − τσ
2
2ω(V l)
(
e−rV
l − e−rV¯
)
r
A2(V
l) =
τσ2
2ω(V l)
(
erV¯ − erV l
)
r
ω(V l) = erV¯−rV
l − erV l−rV¯ .
The three terms A1(V
l), A2(V
l) and ω(V l) typify the uncertainty inherent in the model since
they depend on the uncertain fundamental value V l.
Rearranging A1(V
l) and A2(V
l) yields
A1(V
l) = − rσ
2τ
2
(
erV l + erV¯
)(8)
A2(V
l) =
er(V
l+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erV l + erV¯
) .
Next, we describe the sequence of events and the strategic interactions between the central bank
and market participants.
11Unfortunately, Kleins (1992) modelling approach does not lend itself naturally to the asymmetric one-sided
band exchange rate regime case. That may explain why the current paper is the ﬁrst to model an asymmetric
one-sided target zone. It also explains why we depart from Klein's (1992) approach on technical grounds.
12A thorough description of the approach is provided by Sarno and Taylor (2003, pp. 177-184).
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3.3 The Situation at the Outset
This section provides an outline of the initial situation. Market participants expectations depend
on their perception of central bank behaviour. We postulate that market participants act on the
assumption of a uniform distribution of possible (unknown) trigger values of fundamentals in
the range [V1, V2]. The uniform distribution makes sense because no a priori information about
intervention trigger points is available. This implies that the probability of an intervention at
time t is
P (Vt = VT ) =
1
V2 − V11{Vt∈[V1,V2]},(9)
where VT is the intervention triggering fundamental value. At the outset, the exchange rate has
not yet moved outside the range
(
S2, S¯
]
.The value-matching condition implies
s(t0) = E(s(t0)),(10)
where
E(s(t0)) = f(t0) + E(A1(V
l(t0)))e
rf(t0) + E(A2(V
l(t0)))e
−rf(t0)(11)
and
E(A1(V
l)) = −
∞∫
−∞
rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) dP = − V2∫
V1
rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv(12)
and
E(A2(V
l)) =
∞∫
−∞
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) dP = V2∫
V1
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv.(13)
Inserting equations (12) and (13) into equation (11) yields
s(t0) = f(t0)−
 V2∫
V1
rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv
 erf(t0)(14)
+
 V2∫
V1
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv
 e−rf(t0).
The general closed-form solution of equation (14) is
s(t0) =f(t0)− e−r(f(t0)+V¯ )σ2τ(15) (
e2f(t0)rr(V1 − V2)−
(
e2f(t0)r + e2rV¯
)(
ln
(
erV1 + erV¯
)
− ln
(
erV2 + erV¯
))
2(V1 − V2) .
Equation (15) describes the dynamics of the exchange rate when the central bank has discretion
on the strong side.13
13The interested reader is referred to Appendix A.1 for the derivation. Note that the closed-form solution in
Klein (1992) is more appealing because it is derived for the symmetric case where the integrals are characteristic.
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To add some intuition, consider the graphical illustration of the exchange rate against the fun-
damentals in Figure 2. The segment ab displays the relationship between the exchange rate
and the fundamentals in case that the exchange has not moved outside the range (S2, S]. The
segment ac respresents the exchange rate dynamics for the unattained velocity interval [V1, V2).
In a nutshell, all possible exchange rate curves are located in the area abc.
V2V1
S
_
S2
S1
m+v
S
a
b
c
Figure 2: Relationship between fundamentals and exchange rate with a continuum of possible interven-
tion triggering exchange rates on the strong side
Once the exchange rate has moved outside the range (S2, S] taking the value S˜, S1 < S˜ <
S2, without an intervention response, the system is changed in two ways. First, the range
of expected intervention triggering exchange rates degenerates to [S1, S˜). Second, the relation
between fundamentals and exchange rate undergoes a change. Denoting f , V1 < f < V2, as the
smallest value of the fundamentals that has so far occured, the new relationship is
s(t) =f(t)− e−r(f(t)+V¯ )σ2τ(16) (
e2f(t)rr(V1 − f)−
(
e2f(t)r + e2rV¯
)(
ln
(
erV1 + erV¯
)
− ln
(
erf + erV¯
))
2(V1 − f) .
Substituting f for V2 in equation (16) implies that fundamental values larger than f are irrelevant.
Analogously, the probability of an intervention at time t, given the fundamental value f has been
observed, becomes
P (Vt = VT |f) = 1
f − V1 1{Vt∈[V1,f)} ∀ f ∈ (V1, V2],(17)
where
lim
f↘V1
P (Vt = VT |f) = 1.(18)
The expectation terms in (12) and (13) are altered accordingly. The updated relationship be-
tween exchange rate and fundamentals also alters the segments in Figure 2. More precisely, the
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segment ab becomes steeper and Krugmans (1991) honeymoon eﬀect weakens.
The framework described above works on the assumption that the non-occurance of an inter-
vention signals the unknown edge of the strong-side band. It reveals the central banks true
preferences and alters market participants expectations. Upon observing the exchange rate
S˜, market participants expect that the intervention triggering exchange rate is located in the
smaller range [S1, S˜) and no intervention will occur as long as the exchange rate remains within
the range [S˜, S]. In addition, the more the exchange rate appreciates, the higher the expected
intervention probability.
In the next subsection, we oﬀer a proper assessment of the post-intervention exchange rate dy-
namics.
3.4 Post-Intervention Exchange Rate Dynamics
As time evolves, an intervention takes place at t = T1. This activates the undisclosed strong-side
band. But at the same time the problem becomes more complicated. One clear implication is
that market participants set a higher probability on central bank intervention close to ST1 .
14
Thus we need to replace the uniform distribution in equation (9) and (17) by a density func-
tion which puts more weight on VT1 and thus on ST1 . On the other hand, the ﬁrst intervention
may not be a landmark decision for the entire future, i.e. the intervention triggering point may
still be a moving target.15 Clearly expectations concerning this target depend on the success of
the last intervention. Therefore we deﬁne market participants expectations of the intervention
triggering exchange rate in t = T2 conditional on the actual exchange rate being located in the
upper, (ST1 , S2], or lower interval, [S1, ST1 ].
16
Starting with the exchange rate dynamics in the lower interval, we consider the conditional
probability function P (Vt = VT2 | S1 ≤ s(t) ≤ ST1). As mentioned above, the distribution func-
tion should put more weight on ST1 . To simplify the problem somewhat, we assume that the
density is convex and deﬁned by
ϕ(v) = λe2(v−VT1 )1{v∈[V1,VT1 ]},(19)
where 0 < λ ≤ 1 controls how much weight is put on VT1 and thus on ST1 .17
When the exchange rate appreciates beyond ST without triggering another intervention, this
newly acquired information serves as feedback to market participants and provides the basis
14In dynamic economic models backward-looking expectations with systematic forecasting errors are inconsistent
with rational behaviour. In nonlinear dynamic models, exhibiting seemingly unpredictable breaks due to the
sporadic nature of the interventions, however, simple "rule of thumb" backward-looking expectation rules may
yield non-systematic forecasting errors. Furthermore, numerous survey studies, such as Cheung and Chinn (2001)
and Menkhoﬀ (1998), uniformly conﬁrm that speculators in foreign exchange markets generally do not rely on
mathematically well-deﬁned econometric or economic models, but instead follow simple backward-looking trading
rules.
15In Kleins (1992) model, the ﬁrst intervention is such a landmark decision for the future. This implies that
after the ﬁrst intervention the model with undisclosed band width collapses to the standard Krugman (1991)
model with full faith in the target zone.
16Whether ST1 is determined to belong to the upper or lower interval, which inﬂuences the conditions in the
conditional probability functions, is negligible for the exchange rate movements, as only a null set is integrated.
17Convex functions are typically used in macroeconomic models with adjustment costs to penalise swift changes
in variables and thereby to induce gradual movements over time. Among the many models with convex adjustment
costs, quadratic functions have been by far the most common speciﬁcation, essentially for tractability reasons.
Without loss of generality and for mathematical convenience, we also assume a quadratic speciﬁcation.
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for updating prior expectations. To be precise, we alter the probability function by using the
smallest observed fundamental f to update the prior beliefs. In our notation, we therefore write
P (Vt = VT2 | f , S1 ≤ s(t) ≤ ST1), in order to show the relation to the updating of f , so that
equation (19) becomes
ϕ(v, f) = λe2(v−f)1{v∈[V1,f ]} ∀ f ∈ (V1, VT1 ].(20)
The quintessence is that the lower the value of f is, the higher the intervention probability.
Ultimately, it is resonable to assign measure 1 to P (Vt = VT2 | f , S1 ≤ s(t) ≤ ST1) on the set
{V1, . . . , VT1}. In other words, the central bank will deﬁnitely intervene in the lower range
[S1, ST1 ]. This is tantamount to
f∫
V1
λe2(v−f) dv = 1.(21)
Equation (21) signiﬁes that λ is a function of f .18
An illustration of the updating-mechanism is provided in Figure 3. The convex curves show the
density in equation (20) for diﬀerent fundamentals f . The horizontal curves show the density of
the uniform distribution over the same interval (V1, f ]. Apparently, the convex density functions
puts more weight on f and penalises more distant values in the interval (V1, f ].
19
V1 f'' f' f
density
smallest observed fundamental
Figure 3: Density function in equation (20) and density function of the uniform distribution on the
interval (V1, f ] for diﬀerent fundamentals f
18In our framework, we approximate the relevant considerations with the simplest functional forms to keep the
model tractable and the conclusions less susceptible to certain twists in the functions. The derivation of λ is
shown in Appendix A.2. Another functional shape for λ is technically feasible if it obeys condition (21).
19In other words, Figure 3 highlights the role of choosing V1. The larger the interval [V1, f ] is set, the ﬂatter the
density in (19) and the uniform distribution. Therefore a diﬀerent choice of V1 implies a diﬀerent exchange rate
curve progression. If V1 takes a value close to f , the curve pastes smoothly near the exchange rate S corresponding
to f . Otherwise, the more distant V1 is from f , the stronger is the smooth pasting eﬀect departing from S. This
provides a helpful instrument, as the size of the interval [V1, f ] is the mirror-image of the publicly perceived need
for an intervention. The following formulas show how this mirror-image is transferred ﬁrst to the expectations of
a monetary operation, which then aﬀects the exchange rate curve progression and the smooth pasting behaviour.
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Next we derive the closed-form expression for the exchange rate in the lower range along the
lines in subsection 3.3. For t ∈ (T1, T2] we obtain
s(t) = f(t) + E(A1(V
l(t)))erf(t) + E(A2(V
l(t)))e−rf(t) ∀s(t) ∈ [S1, ST1 ],(22)
where
E(A1(V
l)) = −
f∫
V1
rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) λe2(v−f) dv(23)
and
E(A2(V
l)) =
f∫
V1
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) λe2(v−f) dv.(24)
Rearranging (23) and (24) using Hypergeometric function 2F1, we obtain the closed form solution
for the exchange rate dynamics in the lower range s(t) ∈ [S1, ST1 ]:20
s(t) =f(t) +
1
2(2 + r)
e−2f−f(t)r r λ σ2 τ
(25)
(
ef(2+r) 2F1
[
1,
2 + r
r
; 2 +
2
r
;−er(f−V¯ )
]
− eV1(2+r) 2F1
[
1,
2 + r
r
; 2 +
2
r
;−er(V1−V¯ )
])
−1
4
e−2f−rV¯ +f(t)r r λ σ2 τ(
e2f 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(f−V¯ )
]
− e2V1 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(V1−V¯ )
])
.
In the upper range of exchange rates (ST1 , S2], however, we face a diﬀerent situation concerning
the public's expectations. As long as the exchange moves above ST1 , the market participants
may remember the last intervention and consider it the oﬀ-the-record strong-side band. This
means they implement Krugman's model (1991) with target zone [ST1 , S]. However, including an
expectation updating process is reasonable when the exchange rate does not approach ST1 for a
longer time. This might be rationalised by changed economic developments. In this situation the
market participants update by taking into account their observations after the ﬁrst intervention.
For implementation, we ﬁx a period of time in which exchange rate behaviour is assumed to
ﬂuctuate as in Krugman's basic target zone model with V l = VT1 in equation (7). After this
period, the public updates its expectations if the exchange rate has departed from ST1 . If the
exchange rate has come close to ST1 , no updating occurs and the basic Krugman model holds.
21.
For an expectations update after a ﬁxed period of time tˆ, the smallest observed fundamentals
f between T1 and T1 + tˆ is used to recondition the relationship between exchange rate and
fundamentals. The exchange rate S corresponding to f is thus used to divide the upper range
20The interested reader might look at the derivation in Appendix A.3. A Hypergeometric function can be
deﬁned in the form of a convergent Hypergeometric series. Many functions can be expressed as special cases of a
Hypergeometric function (eg Exponential, Gamma, Trigometrical and the Bessel functions).
21HKMAs foreign currecny market interventions are carried out in an open and transparent manner and so
are public knowledge. In all cases, the interventions are announced on the day they occur. Agents can therefore
distinguish between movements in f due to interventions and ﬂuctuations due to equation (3)
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(ST1 , S2] into two subsets (ST1 ,S) and [S, S2], where the exchange rate dynamics in the lower
subset (ST1 ,S) are the same as explained above for the lower range [S1, ST1 ]. For consistency,
the exchange rate ﬂuctuations in the subset [S, S2] are modelled as in Krugman's basic target
model.
In our mathematical framework, the exchange rate dynamics in the upper interval (ST1 , S2] are
expressed as follows. As long as no expectation update is implemented, the exchange rate behaves
according to
s(t) = f(t) +A1(VT1)e
rf(t) +A2(VT1)e
−rf(t) ∀ s(t) > ST1 , ∀ t : T1 < t < T1 + tˆ < T2,(26)
where A1 and A2 arise from (8).
The smallest observed fundamental between the i'th and i + 1'th, i ∈ N, expectation update
is denoted by fi. After the ﬁrst expectation update, the exchange rate (if s(t) ≥ Si) moves
according
s(t) = f(t) +A1(fi)e
rf(t) +A2(fi)e
−rf(t) ∀ t : i(T1 + tˆ) ≤ t < (i+ 1)(T1 + tˆ) < T2.(27)
In contrast, the dynamics of the exchange rate s(t) < Si accord with the mechanism in equation
(25).
3.5 Information Content of Further Interventions
In the last subsection, we analysed the exchange rate dynamics assuming that an intervention
only occurs once. This setup may be unrealistic for economies for which (a) the structure of the
economy is constantly evolving in ways that are imperfectly understood by both the public and
policymakers and (b) the policymakers' objective function may change over time and is not fully
known by private agents.22 What happens once further interventions are carried out? Where
does that leave us? For the sake of simplicity we assume that market participants use a weighted
average of past intervention triggering exchange rates as a predictor of future interventions.
Hence, in terms of our notation we deﬁne
STN =
N∑
i=1
ai STi ∀ N ∈ N,(28)
where ai ∈ [0, 1] and
N∑
i=1
ai = 1.
The weighted average exchange rate STN yields the intervals [S1,STN ] and (STN , S2] for the mech-
anism in section 3.4. Corresponding to STN is the fundamental VTN . Equation (28) implies that
the extent to which intervention expectations are anchored can change, depending on economic
developments and (most important) the current and past conduct of monetary policy.23
22Market participants realise, however, that a currency board is no free lunch. For example, countries with
currency boards imported the loose monetary conditions of the advanced economies. This policy put a ﬂoor under
asset prices and eventually created the conditions for the credit crunch of 2008.
23Technically expressed, the coeﬃcients ai in equation (28) show the importance of the last interventions.
However, expectations are also inﬂuenced by V1 (compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent V1 by means of Figure 3).
Therefore, there is also room for expectations, which are not primarily anchored by past interventions.
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3.6 Introduction of a Symmetric Band
On 18 May 2005 the currency board arrangement was altered when ﬁnally a narrow symmetric
target zone of 0.6 percent was introduced with a strong-side CU at HKD 7.75/USD. For the
ﬁrst time, this added a ceiling to the ﬂoor by which it had traditionally managed the currency,
in a move to discourage investors from using the HKD to speculate on RMB appreciation. At
the same time, the weak-side CU was shifted from HKD 7.80/USD to HKD 7.85/USD. These
"reﬁnements" were intended to anchor market expectations and promote smooth functioning of
the currency board arrangement.24
Viewed in restrospect, it is reasonable to say that diﬀerent considerations and assessments may
have prevailed after May 2005. Judged by the HKD exchange rate since January 2004, market
participants may have assessed the newly introduced symmetric band as generously dimensioned.
Alternatively, one can well imagine that ﬁnancial markets may not have based their expectations
on a blind faith in the eﬀectiveness of the currency board mechanism and the will and commit-
ment of the monetary authorities to defend the edges of the band.25 If markets can ﬁgure out
the potential fragility of the edges and perform the requisite backward induction, then a target
zone may loose its reputation and stabilising power.26
We implement the credibility issues arising in the new regime via a new version for equation
(28). Credibility is deﬁned as the capacity of the policymakers to announce a policy which is
trusted by market participants. For analytical convenience we modify the model such that STN
is given by
STN =
N∑
i=1
ai STi + aA SA, ∀ N ∈ N,(29)
where SA is the announced strong-side band, the coeﬃcients aA, ai ∈ [0, 1] and
N∑
i=1
ai = 1− aA.
In other words, STN is the weighted average of the past N interventions and the announced
strong-side band SA, and the coeﬃcient aA gauges the extent to which the announcement is
seen as credible. A larger aA coeﬃcient ties STN closer to SA. Subsequently, the full credibility
scenario is given by STN = SA and VTN = V1 (see Figure 2). For STN > SA the credibilty
constraint is not binding. Lastly, the imperfect credibility case, where the public doubt the
monetary authority's ability to defend the announced band, is given by STN < SA.
In the next section we conduct an analysis of the model by resorting to numerical methods.
24For a graphical display, see Figure 1.
25The 1-year forward rate of the HKD was consistently outside the convertibility zone between October 2005
and the the start of 2007. This is known as Svenssons (1992, 1994) 100% credibility test and indicates that
ﬁnancial market participants have initially revealed scepticism about the ability of the new strong side CU to
limit exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Intermittent upward pressure on the HKD occurred again in autumn 2007
when HKMA interventions again were aimed at anchoring market expectations. Related empirical analysis of the
credibility of the two-sided system is scarce, exceptions being Fung and Yu (2007) and Hui and Fong (2007).
26The HKMA would not be the ﬁrst central bank to do this. For example, in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) currencies were initially allowed to ﬂuctuate no more than 2.25 % above or below their ﬁxed
bilateral rates. The UK joined in 1990 but was forced to leave in 1992 when sterling came under speculative
pressure. Fluctuation bands were then widened to ±15 % in 1993 to avoid defending the indefensible.
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4 Putting it all Together
The idea is to make our model match exchange rate data of interest.27 Figure 4 illustrates the
interventions of the HKMA over the period 2001 to 2007.28 Contrary a common view, Hong
Kongs currency board is not a simple rule-based monetary policy but rather involves some
discretion. Figure 4 also shows that the currency board was one-sided until May 2005, i.e. there
was a commitment to sell, but not to buy, US dollars at 7.80 HKD/USD. The spot exchange
rate of HKD against USD remained on the strong side from autumn 2003 through January 2004,
with repeated foreign exchange market interventions by the HKMA to stem the upward pressure
amidst continued capital inﬂows.29 This stepping in and "leaning against the wind" in late 2003
to defend the HKD peg to the US dollar highlights the fear that an appreciation of HKD might
hurt the reputation of the currency board system. Ultimately, there was a slight easing in the
strength of the HKD in late January 2004, amidst growing concern about the spread of avian ﬂu
in East Asia.
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Figure 4: Strong side operations
The graph also highlights the ﬁve points indicated by S′- S′v. Below we calibrate the dynamics
of the exchange rate at these instants.
27At the end of the day, it is always useful to acknowledge that the theoretical framework and calibrations
primarily serve as a communication device. The modelling approach introduced in this paper goes some way
towards achieving the purpose of understanding the dynamics of the HKD. Yet we do not claim empirical accuracy
for the model but use it rather for qualitative features and predictions.
28Interventions refer to net injections or withdrawals of funds by HKMA in the interbank money market. For
the daily market operations data, see http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/statistics/msb/index.htm.
29Interventions were necessary because markets believed that the HKD would appeciate alongside the RMB
made the automatic adjustment mechanisms of the currency board system ineﬀective. For an econometric logit
analysis of monetary operations conducted by the HKMA, using daily data for the one-sided regime between
September 1998 and December 2001, see Gerlach (2005).
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First we derive the exchange rate dynamics prior to the strong-side interventions at ST1 . The
benchmark set of parameters for the simulation is σ = 0.01, τ = 0.9, V1 = 2.035 ≈ ln(7.65).
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Figure 5: S -shaped curve for S′ = ln(7.78)
The ﬁrst point to note is that the relationship between fundamentals and exchange rate is an S -
shaped curve, i.e. the exchange rate is a function of the fundamentals and the expected exchange
rate, leading to a disconnect between fundamentals and nominal volatility. Two properties of
the solution are apparent from Figure 5. First, the upper weak-side band is fully credible.
Second, as long as no intervention occurs, market participants expect a further appreciation of
the HKD beyond S′. Where does that leave us? For S′ = ln(7.78), for example, the "lens" below
the horizontal line indicates that the perceived exchange rate band ranges up to approximately
2.05 ≈ ln(7.768).
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the exchange rate for a given level of V1 determining the lower
bound of the perceived exchange rate interval prior to the ﬁrst intervention.30 Next we explore the
sensitivity of the conclusions presented above to assumptions about V1. The eﬀect of alternative
V1 parameters is indicated in Figure 6. The S -shaped curves illustrate that the appreciation
pressure is perceived to be less severe for larger V1 parameters. This leads to a narrower perceived
target zone range. The intuition for the result is straightforward and can be sketched as follows.
The moderating honeymoon eﬀect is the stronger, the better the reputation of the policymaker,
which leads to a narrower interval for the fundamentals that can trigger an intervention. Formally
stated, given the uniform distribution in equations (9) and (17) the probability of an intervention
increases with larger values of V1.
30In the theoretical modelling framework, V1 is assumed to be exogenous, neglecting central bank incentives
to inﬂuence expectations with announcements. Rational central banks choose "verbal interventions" as a toolkit
since it has the ability to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve
central banks macroeconomic objectives. On the other hand, when optimal policies are dynamically inconsistent,
announcements will only be considered cheap talk. For a survey of this partially credible commitment device, see
Blinder et al. (2008).
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Figure 6: S -shaped curves for S′ = ln(7.78) and V1 ≈ ln(7.65) vs. V ′1 ≈ ln(7.50)
We now return to our main theme and consider the exchange rate dynamics after the ﬁrst inter-
vention, i.e. S′′ and S′′′ in Figure 4. Interventions induce market participants to make inferences
about HKMA preferences, i.e. to predict the implicit strong-side band. How does the intervention
aﬀect the belief of the public? As demonstrated in subsection 3.5 of the theoretical framework,
credibility increases discretely with successive interventions. Furthermore, interventions inﬂu-
ence future behaviour until the learning process brings beliefs closely in line with reality. The
resulting exchange rate dynamics in S′′ and S′′′ after the ﬁrst intervention can be studied with
the help of Figure 7.
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Figure 7: S -shaped curves with learning about the ﬁrst intervention
Again we obtain a family of S -shaped curves. Comparing the exchange rate dynamics for
S′′ = ln(7.76) and S′′′ = ln(7.74), three diﬀerences are apparent. First, the relationship be-
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tween fundamentals and exchange rate becomes steeper, and the non-linear eﬀect is reduced for
S′′′ = ln(7.74). Second, since the exchange rate has appreciated beyond S′′ = ln(7.76), the
perceived bandwidth has increased. Third, and not less importantly, central bank interventions
are expected to be more likely and more intensive at S′′′ = ln(7.74). This means that expecta-
tions of further appreciations are lower and the stabilizing eﬀect of the undisclosed target zone
increases.31
Over the last decade, central banks have implemented new versions of target zone exchange rate
regimes. In Hong Kong, a symmetric band
(
S, S¯
)
forming upper and lower limits for HKD ﬂuc-
tuations around the central parity was adopted in May 2005, as an integral part of the currency
board regime (see Figure 1). By way of example, we ﬁnally calibrate the dynamics of the ex-
change rate according to equation (25) and (29) for S′v (5 July 2005) and Sv (25 October 2007).
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Figure 8: S -shaped exchange rate dynamics in the symmetric target zone
Viewed in retrospect, Figure 8 displays the exchange rate dynamics for S′v = ln(7.77) ≈ 2.0502
and Sv = ln(7.755) ≈ 2.0483. We have assumed N = 8 in equation (29). The resultant aA-
coeﬃcients for S′v and Sv are aA ≈ 0.309 and aA ≈ 0.827, respectively (see Appendix A.4).
The calibration exercise suggests several conclusions. As a start, Figure 8 tells essentially the
same qualitative story from the exchange rate dynamics point of view. Again we obtain S -
shaped behaviour of the exchange rate. The diﬀerence is in the detail. First, the exchange
rate is now stabilised at the credible upper edge S¯ = ln(7.85) ≈ 2.0605.32 Second, at S′v the
lower (strong-side) edge of the band is perceived to be credible according to the calibrations.
Market participants form beliefs that the automaticity of the currency board system and/or
market operations conducted in light of market conditions are eﬀective. This calibration result is
consistent with the empirical fact that on 5 July 2005 the 1-year forward rate S1−Y ear = 7.7528
was slightly above the strong-side band at 7.75 HKD/USD, i.e. no HKD appreciation beyond
31Further points after the next interventions yielded qualitatively similar, although quantitatively diﬀerent,
results. For brevity of exposition, only the exchange rate dynamics for S′′ and S′′′ is presented here. Interested
readers may obtain further calibrations of the model dynamics from the authors upon request.
32Please note that the upper band of the target zone hasnt been tested to the limit during the sample period.
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the strong-side band was expected by the market. Third, in autumn 2007 another episode with
strong pressure for revaluation occurred (see Figure 4).33 Subsequently, the HKMA started to
conduct operations in the foreign exchange market with the intent to stabilise the rate. In the
end, stability was maintained. The simulated S -shaped dynamics for 25 October 2007 indicates
that this time appreciations of the HKD beyond the strong-side band S = ln(7.75) were expected
by the market, i.e. market participants had doubts about the ability and/or commitment of the
HKMA to defend the narrow band in the face of exchange rate shocks.34
5 Summary and Conclusion
The modelling framework in the paper provides a variation of the standard hard edge target
zone concept. The theoretical literature provides few clues to understanding the phenomenon of
one-sided target zones. The classical model of Krugman (1991) describes the behaviour of the
exchange rate in a perfectly known and credible symmetric target zone. Klein (1992) presents a
model in which the width of the symmetric band is unknown to the public. The exchange rate
is thus a function of fundamentals and expected bandwidth. Unfortunately, he only analyses the
dynamics within symmetric bands up to the ﬁrst intervention.
We have considered a model of an asymmetric target zone with an undisclosed strong-side band
and learning by market participants. Depending upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of
interventions, market participants revise their intervention probabilities and the location of the
oﬀ-the-record strong-side band. To study the expectations-updating scheme and the mechanisms
that give rise to the dynamics of the exchange rate, we consider Hong Kongs exchange rate
regime since the turn of the millenium. We believe the model allows an elegant and parsimonious
treatment of undisclosed asymmetric target zones. The model in this paper is stylised, but the
results are rich and may be of relevance to other target zone economies. Nevertheless, the analysis
may be pressed further, to show how uncertainty about exchange rate policy might result from
uncertainty about broader government objectives such as the Pearl River Delta integration and
how this uncertainty can be reduced by precommitments.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equation (15)
At ﬁrst we solve the integrals in (14). Manipulations of the integrand provide the primitive
ln(erv + erV¯ ) of re
rv
erv+erV¯
. Therefore we obtain
E(A1(V
l)) =
V2∫
V1
− rσ
2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv
33Our analysis invites a number of questions. One of these is why the HKMA cannot take actions which would
provide an unambiguous signal of its intentions. For a model with Markov switching and recurrent interventions
to keep the HKD within the band, see Chen et al. (2010). The regime-dependent toolkit makes the perceived
nonlinear swings in exchange rate pressure tractable.
34This calibration result is consistent with the empirical fact that on 25 October 2007 the 1-year forward rate
S1−Y ear = 7.728 was below the strong-side band at 7.75 HKD/USD. One perceived risk was that the newly
introduced symmetric bands might be widened in the future.
17
=
σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
V2∫
V1
re−rV¯ erV¯
erv + erV¯
dv
=
e−rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
V2∫
V1
rerV¯ + rerv − rerv
erv + erV¯
dv
=
e−rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
V2∫
V1
r
(
erv + erV¯
)
erv + erV¯
− re
rv
erv + erV¯
dv
=
e−rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
V2∫
V1
r − re
rv
erv + erV¯
dv
=
e−rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
(
rv − ln(erv + erV¯ )
) ∣∣∣∣∣
V2
V1
=
−e−rV¯ σ2τ
(
r(V1 − V2) + ln(erV2 + erV¯ )− ln(erV1 + erV¯ )
)
2(V1 − V2)
and
E(A2(V
l)) =
V2∫
V1
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) 1
V2 − V1 dv
=− e
rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2)
V2∫
V1
rerv
erv + erV¯
dv
=− e
rV¯ σ2τ
2(V1 − V2) ln(e
rv + erV¯ )
∣∣∣∣∣
V2
V1
=
erV¯ σ2τ
(
ln(erV1 + erV¯ )− ln(erV2 + erV¯ )
)
2(V1 − V2) .
Now we derive the closed form expression (15) using both expectation values in equation (14).
s(t0) =f(t0)−
ef(t0)r−rV¯ σ2τ
(
r(V1 − V2) + ln
(
erV2 + erV¯
)
− ln
(
erV1 + erV¯
))
2(V1 − V2)
+
e−f(t0)r+rV¯ σ2τ
(
ln
(
erV1 + erV¯
)
− ln
(
erV2 + erV¯
))
2(V1 − V2)
= f(t0)− e−r(f(t0)+V¯ )σ2τ(
e2f(t0)rr(V1 − V2)−
(
e2f(t0)r + e2rV¯
)(
ln
(
erV1 + erV¯
)
− ln
(
erV2 + erV¯
))
2(V1 − V2)
A.2 Derivation of λ
An easy way to choose λ properly is to derive it from condition (21), which claims that
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1
!
=
f∫
V1
λe2(v−f) dv = λ
1
2
e2v−2f
∣∣∣∣∣
f
V1
= λ
1
2
− λ1
2
e2V1−2f
⇒ λ = 11
2 − 12e2V1−2f
.
A.3 Derivation of equation (25)
Before we prove equation (25), we provide a short introduction to the Hypergeometric function.
The Hypergeometric function 2F1 is the convergent Gauss Hypergeometric series
2F1 [a, b; c; z] =
Γ(c)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
∞∑
n=0
Γ(a+ n)Γ(b+ n)
Γ(c+ n)
zn
n!
,
where the circle of convergence is the unit circle |z| = 1 and Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function.
The relationship between the factorial and the Gamma function is deﬁned as Γ(n+ 1) = n! for
all n ∈ N. The functional equation of the Gamma function is xΓ(x) = Γ(x+ 1) for all x ∈ R+.
An important property of Hypergeometric functions is that the six functions 2F1 [a± 1, b; c; z],
2F1 [a, b± 1; c; z] and 2F1 [a, b; c± 1; z] are contiguous to 2F1 [a, b; c; z]. They are used to express
one of them as a linear combination of any two of the other contiguous functions and are derived
by Gauss. The two relations that are applied in the following are
Property 1: bzc 2F1 [a+ 1, b+ 1; c+ 1; z] = 2F1 [a+ 1, b; c; z]− 2F1 [a, b; c; z]
Property 2: a2F1 [a+ 1, b; c; z] = b 2F1 [a, b+ 1; c; z]− (b− a)2F1 [a, b; c; z]
Another important property is
Property 3: 2F1 [a, b; b; z] = (1− z)−a
A useful overview of the linear combinations and other interesting relations is given in Abramowitz
and Stegun (1972).
Being equipped with this short introduction to Hypergeometric functions 2F1, we turn to the
calculation of the expectation E(A1(V
l)).
E(A1(V
l)) =
f∫
V1
− rσ
2τ
2
(
erv + erV¯
) λe2(v−f) dv
=− 1
2
rσ2τλ
f∫
V1
e2(v−f)
erv + erV¯
dv
=− 1
4
r λ σ2 τ e−2f+2v−rV¯ 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(v−V¯ )
] ∣∣∣∣∣
f
V1
=− 1
4
e−2f−rV¯ r λ σ2 τ(
e2f 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(f−V¯ )
]
− e2V1 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(V1−V¯ )
])
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In order to prove the third equality, we show that the derivative of
1
2 e
−2f+2v−rV¯
2F1
[
1, 2r ;
2+r
r ;−er(v−V¯ )
]
equals the integrand in the second equation. As a prelim-
inary we consider the derivative of the Hypergeometric function. The derivation of the Hyper-
geometric function is
d
dv
(
2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(v−V¯ )
])
=
d
dv
(
Γ
(
2
r + 1
)
Γ (1) Γ
(
2
r
) ∞∑
n=0
Γ (1 + n) Γ
(
2
r + n
)
Γ
(
2
r + 1 + n
) −enr(v−V¯ )
n!
)
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Γ
(
2
r + 1
)
Γ (1) Γ
(
2
r
) ∞∑
n=0
Γ (1 + n) Γ
(
2
r + n
)
Γ
(
2
r + 1 + n
) nr
(
−enr(v−V¯ )
)
n!
=
Γ
(
2
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)
Γ (1) Γ
(
2
r
) ∞∑
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2
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)
Γ
(
2
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) r
(
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Γ
(
2
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)
Γ (2) Γ
(
2
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(
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(
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(
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)n
n!
=− rer(v−V¯ ) 2
2 + r
2F1
[
2,
2
r
+ 1;
2
r
+ 2;−er(v−V¯ )
]
.
The third equality holds because the ﬁrst summand in the line above is zero. For the fourth
equality we use the functional equation of the Gamma function, which results in a Hypergeometric
function with new parameters.
According to the order of the equal signs the properties 1-3 are applied:
r
−2er(v−V¯ )
2 + r
2F1
[
2,
2
r
+ 1;
2
r
+ 2;−er(v−V¯ )
]
=r
(
2F1
[
2,
2
r
;
2
r
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]
− 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2
r
+ 1;−er(v−V¯ )
])
=r
(
2
r
2F1
[
1,
2
r
+ 1;
2
r
+ 1;−er(v−V¯ )
]
− 2
r
2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2
r
+ 1;−er(v−V¯ )
])
=2
(
1
1 + er(v−V¯ )
− 2F1
[
1,
2
r
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2
r
+ 1;−er(v−V¯ )
])
.
Now we have obtained all the ingredients for diﬀerentiating the above mentioned primitive.
d
dv
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2
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;
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;−er(v−V¯ )
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]
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1
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− 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(v−V¯ )
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1
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− 2F1
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2
r
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]
=
e2(v−f)
erV¯
(
1 + er(v−V¯ )
)
=
e2(v−f)
erV¯ + erv
.
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The other expectation is given without proof of the primitive, as it is derived in a like manner.
E(A2(V
l)) =
f∫
V1
er(v+V¯ )rσ2τ
2
(
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) λe2(v−f) dv
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])
Hence the closed form solution results in
s(t) =f(t) +
1
2(2 + r)
e−2f−f(t)r r λ σ2 τ(
ef(2+r) 2F1
[
1,
2 + r
r
; 2 +
2
r
;−er(f−V¯ )
]
− eV1(2+r) 2F1
[
1,
2 + r
r
; 2 +
2
r
;−er(V1−V¯ )
])
− 1
4
e−2f−rV¯ +f(t)r r λ σ2 τ(
e2f 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(f−V¯ )
]
− e2V1 2F1
[
1,
2
r
;
2 + r
r
;−er(V1−V¯ )
])
.
A.4 Calculation of the coeﬃcient aA
Suppose that market participants assign the same weight to the last N = 8 interventions in
their expectations formation process. In the case where S′v = ln(7.77) and Sv = ln(7.755), these
market operation dates and the corresponding HKD spot exchange rates are:
12.10.04 7.7925 10.11.04 7.7812
25.10.04 7.7771 08.12.04 7.7705
27.10.04 7.7777 10.12.04 7.7753
01.11.04 7.7799 27.05.05 7.7775
As a start, this enables us to calculate the logarithmized exchange rates ST1 - ST8 . The value of
aA for S
′v = ln(7.77) can then be solved from
(1− aA) 1
8
8∑
i=1
STi + aA SA = S
′v.
This equation is derived from equation (29). However, the question arises as to why the left hand
side is equal to S′v. One has to take into consideration that whenever a smaller fundamental f
is observed, the interval of possible intervention triggering exchange rates is truncated. Where
does that leave us? In case of S′v, the original interval [S1,STN ] is reduced to [S1, S′v] and so we
can use S′v to calculate the unkown coeﬃcient aA. The resulting parameter is aA ≈ 0.309. In
an analogous manner, aA ≈ 0.827 is obtained for Sv.
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